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I.  Introduction 
The economic crisis has resulted in renewed attention to the creation of a new 
global reserve system.  Some of the reasons should be obvious.1  At least since the 
beginning of the century, the dollar has no longer seemed a good store of value; 
its value has been volatile and apparently subject to secular decline.2  But the 
crisis has further undermined confidence in the U.S. economy and its 
management, and thus the dollar as a reserve currency (Bergsten 2009; 
Eichengreen 2009; United Nations 2010).3  The way the country responded to the 
crisis—the enormous increase in debt and the ballooning of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet, from $800 billion to more than $2 trillion—provided further 
worries to those holding large reserves, typified by statements of China’s Premier 
Wen Jiabao.  There were concerns about inflation (though those anxieties could 
be addressed by shifting holdings to TIPS, inflation-indexed bonds) and declining 
exchange rates. Moreover, to many, especially outside the United States, it seems 
peculiar that a twenty-first century global economy should be dependent on the 
currency of a single country.   
So long as America was the single superpower and its economy was 
dominant, few wanted to challenge its seeming resistance to the creation of a 
global reserve system.  But with the crisis, this suddenly changed. The UN 
Commission of Experts on Reform of the International Monetary and Financial 
System4 highlighted the ways in which the dollar reserve system contributed to 
global financial instability and a weak global economy.5 Those in developing 
1 A point noted in Chapter 9 of Stiglitz (2006).
2 On a broad, trade-weighted index, the value of the dollar declined almost 10% from January 
2000 to January 2010 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/summary/indexb_m.txt) and 
the volatility of the dollar exceeds that of the euro (Chinn and Frankel 2008).
3 As usual, one has to be careful to distinguish between a shift in the demand curve and a change 
in the equilibrium demand. The demand curve is also affected by perspectives of risks associated 
with other currencies.  Thus, while the dollar may be perceived as riskier than it was, so too might 
the euro (as a result of, say, the Greek crisis).  The result is that relative holdings of dollars in 
reserves may have changed less than one would have expected, focusing only on the decline in the 
confidence in the dollar.  While data on reserve holdings are incomplete, for emerging and 
developing countries, dollar holdings as a percentage of the allocated reserves (reserves whose 
currency composition has been identified) fell more than 21%, and as a percentage of total foreign 
exchange holdings by more than 46% between 2000 and 2009  (IMF Statistics Department 2010). 
But perceptions of increased risk associated with holdings of government paper may also have 
played an important role in the growth of sovereign wealth funds; countries are moving substantial 
amounts of their “precautionary savings” into other assets.  (See the discussion below.) 
4 United Nations 2009. 
5 These effects have been discussed extensively elsewhere, including in the other papers in this 
symposium (see, in particular, Ocampo (2007/08; 2010a, b), Ocampo and Williamson (2010) and 
Williamson (2010) and the papers cited there; in Robert Triffin, 1960; and in Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 2010 and Stiglitz, 2006).  The most obvious of these concerns is that setting aside reserves 
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countries and emerging markets are especially sensitive to the inequities of the 
current system, where the United States is able to borrow at low interest rates 
from these countries.6   
These concerns—a global reserve system that seems inequitable and that 
contributes to a weak and volatile global economy—have culminated in a demand 
for the creation of a new global reserve system.  Based on the report of the UN 
Commission, in June 2009 the United Nations Conference on the World Financial 
and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development called for the beginning of 
discussions; several countries—China7, France, Russia—have been vocal about 
the desirability of a new system, though the United States has not enthusiastically 
endorsed such a discussion.8    
One final factor has provided impetus to the discussions:  the newly issued 
reserves could provide a convenient way of helping finance expenditures for 
climate change adaptation and mitigation for developing countries.  The 
developed countries made a commitment to provide such support in the Rio 
Convention in 1992, and it is generally thought that as much as $100 to $200 
billion a year are required.  Yet, especially after the crisis, as national debts have 
soared in most of the developed countries, finding the money appears increasingly 
difficult.  Newly created reserves can help fund “global public goods,” including 
expenditures related to climate change and development.9    
This paper does not make a political forecast concerning whether or when 
a new global reserve system will be created.  What it tries to do is to analyze the 
impact of alternative reserve systems within a global general equilibrium model, 
focusing in particular on the sources of demand for reserves.   It argues that the 
real choice facing the international community is whether to create, 
systematically, a new global reserve system, or to “muddle through,” moving 
from the dollar-based system to a two- or three-currency reserve system, which 
(income that countries are not spending) depresses global aggregate demand.  (See, for example, 
John M. Keynes 1942-43.)
6 See Rodrik (2006) and Stiglitz (2006).  R. N. Cooper (2010), citing a study by the McKinsey 
Global Institute, estimates the net benefits to the United States in the order of $40 to $70 billion.  
Even if these benefits do not constitute an “exorbitant privilege,” the United States almost surely 
has access to funds at a slightly lower interest rate than it otherwise would.  Later, we suggest that 
the net benefits to the United States may be negative, taking into account the macroeconomic 
consequences.  
7 Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China, gave a widely acclaimed speech on 
the subject, “Reform the International Monetary System,” March 23, 2009 (available at 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178), shortly after the UN Commission, 
in its preliminary report to the UN, highlighted the need for a new global reserve system. 
8 Indeed, at the June 2009 UN Summit, the United States expressed explicit reservations about 
such discussions, at least within the context of the UN.  
9 See Soros (2002) and IMF Survey (2010). 
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could be even more unstable and volatile.  We believe there is much to be 
gained—even for the United States—from a move to a new global reserve system.   
It should be obvious why it is imperative to look at reserves and the 
associated current and capital account deficits and surpluses from a global general 
equilibrium perspective.  The American-centric view has seen the country’s trade 
deficit through the lens of the “twin” deficit—America’s large fiscal deficit 
results in (or “causes”) a large trade deficit.  But equilibrium patterns of trade 
(and the accompanying exchange rates) are the result of demands and supplies of 
all countries.  A closer look at the data over time and across countries shows (a) 
there is no close association between trade and fiscal deficits; and (b) trade 
deficits are as likely to “cause” (in the sense of Granger) fiscal deficits as the 
other way around. Countries with large trade deficits may increase fiscal deficits 
to maintain aggregate demand and full employment (Greenwald and Stiglitz 
2010). 
II. The Historical Role of Reserves 
Reserves were required under the Bretton Woods system to enable countries to 
intervene in foreign exchange markets to maintain fixed exchange rates in the face 
of fluctuating demands for their currencies. Much of the reserves were held in 
dollars.  As levels of trade and cross-border investment grew, the demand for 
reserves rose with the consequent scale of foreign currency transactions. The 
supply of dollar reserves to meet this demand had to come from U.S. deficits on 
either current or capital account. This created two fundamental problems. 
First, since the United States under this system owned the global printing 
press, there was no natural limit to U.S. balance of payments deficits. This was, 
obviously, profoundly disquieting. It simultaneously tended to undermine 
confidence in the dollar. This is the well-known Triffin dilemma.10    
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, this problem was masked by 
a set of fortuitous circumstances. The economic destruction in Europe and Asia 
caused by the war meant that the United States, with its economy unscathed, was 
an essential source of both the goods required for reconstruction and the funds 
necessary to finance it. A U.S. trade surplus, coupled with domestic U.S. price 
stability, generated confidence in the value of the dollar. At the same time, 
because returns to capital in the devastated economies of Europe and Asia were 
far higher than those in the United States, there was a naturally large U.S. capital 
account deficit, and the amounts in excess of the current account surplus provided 
10 At the time, under the fixed exchange rate system with gold convertibility, the worry was the 
ability of the United States to meet its commitment if holders of dollars demanded the gold.  
Today, the worry is different:  that the value of dollars (in terms of goods or other currencies) will 
decline.
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a supply of U.S. currency to support global growth in reserves. U.S. government 
deficits on the international account, associated with the Marshall Plan, troop 
commitments overseas and the Korean War, were, to the extent that they were not 
used to purchase imports (say from the United States), a source of global reserves.  
Yet, even under these conditions, it is important to remember that the early 
Bretton Woods system was not fully self-sustaining. It was supported by 
extensive capital outflow controls in Europe and Asia. The United States was able 
to make high-yielding equity investments in these countries, which were financed 
to a large extent by low-yielding investments in the U.S. government securities 
that foreign countries held as reserves. Not surprisingly, this generated some local 
resentment.11  More significantly, the post-war recovery of Asian and European 
economies reduced and eventually eliminated the U.S. trade surplus (although, 
due to high U.S. equity earnings abroad, the U.S. current account surplus did not 
vanish until considerably later). In concert with the rise in U.S. domestic inflation 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, concern over the future value of the dollar 
began to increase. The Triffin dilemma began to catch up with the Bretton Woods 
system by the late 1960s.  
The problem can be seen another way: assume the U.S. had been able to 
maintain a trade surplus.  To supply the world’s need for reserves would have 
required the United States to simultaneously borrow and lend (or invest)—acting 
as a bank.  But the liabilities are government liabilities, the assets are private 
assets:  the implication was that as reserves increased, even if the national balance 
sheet looked good, the credibility of the reserve currency was put into jeopardy. 
The system was ultimately undone by the lack of sustainability of the 
fixed exchange rates and gold parities that were established in 1944.12  Meanwhile 
the United States had begun to have a trade deficit.  In a sense, this was 
inevitable, once there was no longer a compelling reason for a net flow of 
(private) funds from the United States to Europe to finance reconstruction.  
11 See Servan-Schreiber (1968).  This resentment is not unlike that of many developing countries 
today, which see themselves as simultaneously lending to the United States at a low interest rate 
and borrowing at a high interest rate.
12 The reasons for this are well known:  Long-term changes in the terms of trade related to 
differential productivity growth rates across countries could not be offset by either inflation in the 
high export growth countries (e.g. Germany, Switzerland and Japan, which were strongly inflation 
averse) or by deflations in the countries whose trade parities were deteriorating. Significant 
deflation in a modern industrial economy is a process of such length and difficulty that few, if any, 
governments are prepared to commit to it. Reserves provided by U.S. international deficits were 
inadequate to finance extended periods of exchange rate imbalance. More importantly, exchange 
rates at 1944 parities were permanently, not temporarily, out of balance. If these rates prevailed 
today, the euro (based on the post-war Mark and Franc exchange rates) would be about $.25 and 
the yen would be over 300 to the dollar. U.S. international deficits at those rates would be 
completely unmanageable. In the end, the United States abandoned fixed exchange rates in 1971 
and the rest of the world followed.
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Thus, the global financial system of today differs markedly from that prior 
to 1970 (the world about which Triffin was writing) in two ways.  The United 
States has moved into a current account deficit, and the world has a flexible 
exchange rate system.   The U.S. deficits were, in a sense, a natural concomitant 
of the demand for increased reserves.  
III. The Impact of Flexible Exchange Rates 
The need for national reserve holdings did not vanish with the movement to 
flexible exchange, nor did the post-1971 decline of the dollar eliminate the 
dollar’s role as a global reserve currency. Foreign exchange market instability 
may have actually increased the demand for reserves to dampen destabilizing 
short-term fluctuations in rates.13 In the absence of capital controls, which were 
greatly reduced post-1971, speculative capital flow may lead to short, sharp 
changes in exchange rates as traders try to take advantage of anticipated future 
changes in rates.14  
At the same time, the Triffin dilemma may be made worse. The United 
States, as a reserve-currency country, still enjoys the freedom from international 
deficit discipline that it enjoyed under the original Bretton Woods fixed-rate 
regime. But now the cost to others of dollar deficits and/or inflationary U.S. 
domestic policies is greatly enhanced. With fixed exchange rates, the United 
States could not reduce the value of its reserve indebtedness by devaluing the 
dollar. With flexible rates, unrestrained U.S. deficits, which undermine 
confidence in the future value of the dollar, lead to anticipatory declines in its 
value. As these declines occur, they further reduce confidence in the dollar as a 
medium of international exchange. The result can be a major erosion in the value 
of U.S. overseas liabilities. Thus, present day concerns with U.S. international ‐
deficits and the future value of the dollar (especially relative to Asian currencies) 
are not just an aspect of the current crisis; they are inherent in a reserve system 
dominated by a single currency.  
13 European countries eventually stopped accumulating reserves (though between March 2009 and 
April 2010 Eurosystem foreign exchange reserves increased by some 5%; see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/data/EUA/eng/hsteua.csv). Countries that 
believe that they have ready access to (hard currency) credit, should they need it, have little need 
to hold reserves, which can have high opportunity costs.  Total holdings of reserves have, of 
course, increased enormously, largely in developing countries, for reasons that we explain later in 
the paper.  
14 What happened was in marked contrast to what “market fundamentalists” had predicted would 
happen.  They believed that markets would stabilize exchange rates.  The fact that the advocates of 
moving to flexible exchange rates underestimated the costs does not mean, of course, that the 
move was wrong:  it was clearly impossible to make a fixed exchange rate system work.  
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The shift to flexible exchange rates exacerbated a second aspect of the 
dollar-dominated global reserve system. With fixed exchange rates, chronic 
surplus countries are limited to those benefiting from favorable productivity and 
resource (e.g. oil price) trends that improve their terms of trade. With flexible 
exchange rates any country that is willing to see the value of its currency fall can 
create a potential surplus by manipulating its exchange rate downward. Broadly 
speaking it achieves this either by selling its own currency, of which it has an 
unlimited supply, in foreign exchange markets or by lowering domestic interest 
rates in order to drive financial capital abroad. In the latter case, sales of local 
currency by departing investors drives down the exchange rate.15  
IV.  Global Reserves and the New International Equilibrium/Disequilibrium 
Governments and private agents determine the demand and supply of funds in 
different currencies, and this gives rise to a set of exchange rates and trade 
imbalances.  Concern has been raised about four aspects of the current 
international monetary and financial system:  (a) it is associated with large, 
unsustainable, imbalances; (b) it exhibits high volatility (e.g. in exchange rates, 
interest rates, and access to capital);  (c) responses to the volatility lead to 
increased demand for reserves, which contributes to an insufficiency of global 
aggregate demand; and (d) there are grave inequities as poor countries lend to rich 
countries at low interest rates and borrow back funds at high interest rates.  A 
central part of these problems is the global reserve system.  At the same time, it 
must be recognized that the global reserve system is not the only problem with the 
global financial system.  Still, a well-designed reform of the reserve system could 
ameliorate all four problems.  Indeed, the four factors interact through the reserve 
system:  a high level of volatility leads to increased demand for reserves, which in 
turn leads to weaker global aggregate demand.   
To analyze the global general equilibrium, we have to understand not only 
America’s supply of reserves, but also the rest of the world’s demand—and this in 
turn is related to why countries might want to run trade surpluses.    
There are several potential motives for doing this. Protection of local 
industry, (e.g. in Germany) can be achieved without restrictive trade measures, 
simply by undervaluing an economy’s currency,  which both  reduces imports and 
stimulates exports. Countries with limited powers of fiscal and monetary 
intervention (e.g. China) may conduct their macroeconomic policy by stimulating 
demand for domestic output through lower exchange rates or, less frequently, by 
reducing demand through upward currency revaluation. The export-led growth 
15 In some cases, this may give rise to inflationary pressures, so that there may be little or no real 
devaluation. But, so far, China has shown that it can contain these inflationary pressures while 
maintaining what appears to many to be an undervalued exchange rate.  
6
Journal of Globalization and Development, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 10
DOI: 10.2202/1948-1837.1126
Brought to you by | Columbia University Law Library New York (Columbia University Law Library New York)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 6/18/12 8:24 PM
model has been championed around the world, and one of the ways of promoting 
exports is a low exchange rate.  The demand for a large margin of safety of 
imports over exports (because, as in Japan, imports of food and raw material are 
regarded as essential to national well-being) can be achieved, along with a high 
level of reserve holdings, through currency manipulation.  Natural resource-
exporting countries, aware of the high volatility of their export prices, need 
stabilization funds to help them weather the periods of low prices.   Finally, 
countries that have historically run deficits, financed through dollar-denominated 
overseas borrowing, may experience the kind of painful adjustment that affected 
East Asia in the late 1990s. A collapse in the value of the currency, leading to a 
sharp rise in the local currency burden of foreign debt, may lead to widespread 
bankruptcies and painful economic contraction. In the wake of such an 
experience, these countries may insure against a recurrence by deliberately 
undervaluing their currencies so they never again have to deal with chronic 
deficits. 
The problem created by these structural surpluses is that, summed over all, 
the global surplus (deficit) must be zero. Thus, chronic surpluses must be offset 
by chronic deficits.  If surplus countries insist on maintaining their current 
account positions, a reduction in the deficit by one country must show up as an 
increase somewhere else.  This can be part of the process of contagion:  a country 
facing a crisis reduces its trade deficit, but the response entails an increase in 
deficits elsewhere, possibly to the point of creating a new crisis elsewhere.     
Ultimately, however, the offsetting deficit has come to reside with the reserve 
currency country, given its ability to borrow in its own currency. The United 
States has become the deficit country of last resort.   
The current system has a deflationary bias for two reasons:  the buildup of 
reserves through trade surpluses means that those countries are producing more 
than they are spending. And to supply reserves, the reserve currency country runs 
a trade deficit, which subtracts from its aggregate demand.16 Unless the impact is 
offset, say by an investment boom or government spending, sluggish growth in 
that country will then tend to reduce the growth in exports by the surplus-seeking 
countries. A U.S. recession inevitably gets transmitted abroad where countries 
seek to offset the resulting balance of payments deterioration by further currency 
manipulation. The result is a chronically unstable global macroeconomic situation 
with a strong deflationary bias.17   
16 We should emphasize that the reserve country may not set out to “supply reserves.”  The trade 
deficits (and reserve supply) are part of the global general equilibrium that arises in response to the 
demand for reserves by other countries.  
17 It is possible, of course, that the reserve country’s ability to borrow at low interest rates could, at 
least in the short run, lead to an increase in its spending that more than offsets the savings on the 
part of the countries accumulating reserves, making net global effect inflationary.  In the past, the 
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V.  The Demand for Reserves 
It is now widely accepted that the demand for reserves has contributed to 
weaknesses in global aggregate demand.18  One response is the creation of a new 
global reserve system (possibly by the expansion of SDRs); another is to reform 
the global financial and economic system in ways that reduce the demand for the 
accumulation of reserves.  This section addresses the second approach.  
To understand how one might reduce the demand for reserves, one has to 
understand the factors that have contributed to the recent unprecedented rise in 
reserves—more than quadrupling over the last decade, from under $2 trillion in 
1999 to more than $8 trillion in 2009, with emerging and developing economies 
responsible for almost three-quarters of that increase.  There are at least three 
contributing demand factors19:  (a) the high level of global macroeconomic 
volatility and the inadequacy of alternative mechanisms for risk mitigation have 
led to a high demand for precautionary savings (reserves); (b) the export-led 
model of growth, which has been touted as the most successful model for 
development, and recent trade agreements that have circumscribed the ability to 
use other instruments to promote exports; and (c)  the high level of natural 
resource price volatility, especially that of oil. 
We will explain why several of these factors have changed in the past 
fifteen years in ways which have led to a marked increased demand for reserves.   
willingness of many developing countries to spend beyond their means—risking future crises—
probably played an important role in offsetting the deflationary bias of the system.  Today, 
however, the deflationary net effect of the current reserve system is of particular concern because 
(i) reserve accumulations are far larger than they were before, say, 1997; (ii) developing countries 
have increasingly subscribed to tenets of fiscal and monetary prudence; and (iii) the ability of the 
United States—which had become the consumer of last resort—to fill in the gap is limited, given 
its household and government indebtedness and monetary policy constraints.  
18 Critics of this view point to the fact that growth in the past decade—during which there has been 
rapid build-up of reserves—has been higher than the previous decade.  The deflationary bias of 
reserve build-up can, at times, be offset by government policy.  Some would argue that this was 
the case during much of the past decade, through an unsustainable monetary policy that supported 
real estate bubbles in many countries.   Currently, monetary policy cannot be used to offset this 
deflationary bias, and there is a worry that the scope for fiscal policy is also limited.  
19 Any global general equilibrium can be understood only as a balance of demand and supply.  We 
have described some of what might be viewed as the reasons developing countries have run 
surpluses.  But their willingness to run surpluses is affected, of course, by the other side of the 
equation, what might be viewed as the “supply of deficits,” which in turn affects global prices (e.g. 
returns on investments abroad). Deregulation and financial sector deception led to a bubble and 
the appearance of high rates of return on large amounts of what turned out to be spurious 
investments. Justin Lin has emphasized this side of the global general equilibrium.
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(a) The high level of global macroeconomic volatility and the inadequacy of 
alternative mechanisms for risk mitigation. 
Since the era of liberalization and deregulation began some three decades ago and 
since the world moved to a system of floating exchange rates (and managed 
floats), the world has been afflicted by repeated economic and financial crises.20  
The recession of 2008 is only the most recent and the most severe.  But those 
countries (such as China) that had large reserves with which to finance a strong 
Keynesian stimulus have fared far better than those without adequate reserves.  
Having reserves doesn’t necessary protect one fully; but had Russia not had 
adequate reserves, it would have faced a far more severe crisis. 
   But even apart from these calamities, an ample supply of reserves upon 
which countries can draw enables them to stabilize exchange rates.  A more stable 
exchange rate reduces a major risk facing businesses (extending years after 
investments are made, so that firms can’t mitigate the risk through futures 
markets), with positive benefits to investment.21 
Such volatility imposes particularly high costs on developing countries 
because financial markets have done an inadequate job in shifting risk (e.g. the 
risk of interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations) from developing countries to 
the developed countries, which should be better able to absorb such risks.  
Standard economic theory suggests that, with efficient capital markets, risk-averse 
developing countries would have borrowed in their own currency. While recent 
theories have explained why private borrowers may borrow excessive amounts in 
foreign currencies, 22 there is no fully adequate explanation of these capital market 
imperfections and “failures.”23 
Given these inadequacies in modern financial markets, countries have set 
aside trillions of dollars in reserves at great cost.  The cost of reserves is largely 
the opportunity cost:  funds effectively lent to the U.S. government (now at close 
to a zero interest rate) could have been invested at home at much higher returns.  
20 Of course, except for the relatively short period after the Great Depression, when strong 
regulations were put into place, market economies have been afflicted with crises since the 
beginning of capitalism. See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
21  The modern theory of the firm has provided a variety of explanations for why firms should be 
expected to behave in a risk-averse manner. (Much of the development of derivatives is justified 
by the fact that such markets help risk-averse firms manage the risks that they face.)   Empirical 
research has not always been able to identify the effect on investment.  However, see Darby et al. 
(1999), Servén (2003), and Aghion et al. (2009).
22 Capital markets are not efficient because developing-country borrowers do not internalize the 
risks they create by borrowing in foreign currencies. (See Korinek 2009).
23 One argument sometimes provided is that there is a moral hazard associated with inflation.  This 
does not provide an adequate explanation, since inflation-indexed bonds and/or bonds linked to 
the exchange rate of similarly situated countries could have been issued.
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That governments are willing to forego those high returns testifies to the high 
social benefits of reserves.24 
The accumulation of reserves does not, of course, mean that countries 
have to run current account surpluses.  They can run a capital account surplus, 
accumulating what are sometimes called “borrowed” reserves.  The problem is 
that such reserves are less reliable; foreigners who have put money into the 
country may demand it back quickly. 25  
(b) The export-led model of growth:  Is there an alternative? 
Governments around the world have been encouraged to promote exports as a 
way of promoting growth.   The countries of East Asia have been well served by 
that model.  One of the reasons that exports may be associated with rapid growth 
is that the growth of these sectors promotes learning—the transformation of the 
economy into a modern industrial and knowledge society.26 
The promotion of exports does not necessarily lead to a trade surplus—
and in fact did not do so to a large extent until the last decade.  In a “three-
commodity model,” one can encourage both exports and imports, shifting 
production and consumption away from import substitutes and non-traded goods.  
24 The fact that a country chooses to hold money in reserves rather than spend it means, of course, 
that in total, it believes the social return from doing so is larger than the alternative.  The full 
(opportunity) costs depend on the circumstances of the country and how the money might have 
been spent. The cost calculus is somewhat more complicated in at least three ways:  (a) many of 
the high-return investments involve domestic resources, and converting foreign exchange earnings 
would lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate and/or an overheated economy, with the 
adverse consequences noted in the text; (b) postponing investment may allow investments in 
technologies that are more appropriate to the country’s evolving economic structure, and hence the 
“cost of delay” may be less than it otherwise would seem; and (c) there are long-term benefits of 
additional “learning” consequent from the extension of the low exchange rate, again reducing the 
cost of “delay.”  Critics of a slow adjustment often focus on the threat to inflation, but most of the 
East Asian countries have been able to contain these inflationary pressures through other 
instruments; however, in other parts of the world, that might not have been the case.  The full 
marginal general equilibrium effect of a change in reserves may differ, too, depending on whether 
the country is running a trade surplus or deficit (whether the reserve accumulation is based on 
“borrowed” reserves).  See the discussion below.
25 In the East Asia crisis, one important measure of a country’s vulnerability was the ratio of its 
dollar-denominated (or other foreign-denominated) short-term liabilities to its reserves. Hence, if a 
country increased its reserves through short-term borrowing, the likelihood of a crisis was 
unchanged—even though its reserves appeared larger.  Only if the country increased its reserves 
by running a trade surplus or borrowing long-term would the likelihood of a crisis be reduced.  A 
global general equilibrium approach (of the kind outlined in Greenwald and Stiglitz [2010]) 
identifies not only the overall level of the demand for reserves, but its composition and structure.  
This will be affected, too, by the ability and willingness of a country to prevent capital flight in the 
event of a crisis.  
26 See Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006).  
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One can still have “trade balance” in an export-led growth model, and many 
countries did so, especially as the increased exports were offset by increased 
imports of capital goods.   
One of the reasons for the change may, in fact, be the combination of 
neoclassical orthodoxy and WTO Uruguay Round strictures that made industrial 
policy more difficult (restricting not only protection levels, but also export and 
other subsidies) and seemingly less attractive.  To encourage exports, then, 
countries had to rely more on exchange rate policy.  But exchange rate policy 
simultaneously encourages exports and discourages imports—giving rise to trade 
surpluses.   
The Uruguay Round agreement may have contributed to the problem in 
another way.  The “Grand Bargain” was supposed to entail a significant reduction 
in agricultural subsidies, but the advanced industrial countries reneged on this part 
of the agreement.27  U.S. subsidies after the Uruguay Round were actually 
increased substantially, and even when the WTO ruled that the U.S. cotton 
subsidies were WTO illegal, there was little change in policy.  While in other 
areas, countries can impose countervailing duties, they are more constrained in 
doing so in agriculture.28  The only way developing countries can offset the 
adverse distributional effect on their poorest citizens is to keep a low exchange 
rate.  To put it another way, were they to allow their currency to appreciate, their 
poorest citizens would be hurt as a result of competition with America and 
Europe’s highly subsidized farmers.  Though they could respond by similarly 
subsidizing their farmers, to do so would take away funds badly needed for 
development.  Thus, a low exchange rate serves both distributional and 
developmental objectives.  But it also results in large build-ups of reserves.   
There are alternative high-growth strategies, and China may in fact be 
switching to such a strategy through government investments in education and 
technology.29   
Export-led growth is important in the initial stages of development as a 
way of promoting technology during a period in which the growth of demand may 
lag the growth of supply.  But part of development strategy is the improvement in 
institutional arrangements that can facilitate the growth of domestic demand (e.g. 
public health and education, and improved financial institutions providing access 
to credit and insurance, which reduce the need for savings).30  But China’s high 
27 See Charlton and Stiglitz (2005).
28 The Uruguay Round created a category of subsidies that were non-actionable (the green box) 
that were supposedly non-distortionary.  A closer look at these subsidies makes clear that most of 
them are distortionary, especially in a world of imperfect capital markets.  
29 It is a switch that is possibly also being encouraged by global trade policy:  TRIPS has made it 
increasingly expensive to rely on foreign technology.
30 China’s gender imbalance may be another factor driving its high household saving rate.  See 
Wei and Zhang (2009) and Du and Wei (2010).
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savings rate is largely associated with a low share of household income in GDP, 
and changing the distribution of income (increasing the share of household 
income in national income) is always difficult and not typically accomplished 
quickly.  
(c) The high level of natural resource price volatility, especially that of oil. 
High growth in China  combined with limited supplies of natural resources have, 
naturally, contributed to increasing prices of exhaustible natural resources like oil.  
The prices of these commodities have also been highly variable.31  Sellers of these 
resources are aware of this variability and have been repeatedly advised on how to 
manage their economies in the presence of this high volatility, through the 
creation of stabilization funds—a form of precautionary savings that 
simultaneously helps avoid exchange rate appreciation (the Dutch disease 
problem).  These accumulations of reserves were particularly important in the 
Middle East in the years before the current crisis. 
Motives for holding (or increasing) reserves are often mixed and may 
change over time.  China may have initially been driven by a “precautionary” 
motive, but current reserves exceed the levels that could be justified on that basis 
alone—current policy seems more related to its export-led growth model.   
We have focused here mostly on those countries that have built up 
reserves through trade surpluses.  But today, as we have noted, many countries 
have reserves that are at least partly a result of capital account surpluses.  Such 
reserves are sometimes called “borrowed” reserves.  There are several motives:  
(a) they may represent precautionary savings, especially against the risk of a 
reversal of the capital flows, especially if there are large amounts of foreign-
denominated short term debts; or (b) they may be an attempt to offset the adverse ‐
inflationary or exchange rate appreciation effects of capital inflows.  In that sense, 
the motives are not unlike those described earlier—to stabilize the economy and 
promote exports from what they would have been in the absence of the 
intervention. It may not be easy or possible to identify, in any particular case, the 
mix of motives.  For our purposes, though, the central point to emerge from this 
analysis is that a change in the reserve system may affect the demand for reserves, 
and this is true whether a country has a trade surplus or a trade deficit, whether or 
not the reserves are borrowed reserves or not, though the magnitude of the effects 
can clearly differ depending on the country’s situation.  The proposal we present 
below, in particular, should have the effect of reducing the “precautionary” 
31 See Hamilton (2009) on recent oil price volatility. There is a view that the financialization of 
commodity markets, documented by Büyüksahin, et al (2008) for oil, has contributed to this 
volatility.  The economics literature, however, provides little support for this hypothesis; see, for 
example, Smith (2009) and Bu ̈yu ̈kşahin and Harris (2009).
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demand for reserves, and to the extent that that is true, it will lead to smaller trade 
surpluses (larger trade deficits) in those countries.32  
VI. Equilibrium Reserve Levels 
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a remarkable build up of reserves.  
Previous subsections have outlined possible explanations.  One may perhaps think 
of this build up of reserves as a movement from one equilibrium (defined, for 
instance, as a desired ratio of reserves to GDP or trade) to another.  We have 
explained the factors that one might have expected to lead to an increase in the 
demand for reserves.  The problem is that some of the factors leading to increased 
demand for reserves are ongoing, increasing the demand still further.  For 
instance, the crisis and the way it was managed globally have shown the value of 
having a high level of reserves, encouraging those countries that did not 
previously have large reserves to accumulate them.  
There are several factors that may, however, tame this demand.  As 
reserves grow globally—especially reserves held in the currency of one country—
perceptions of a risk of a loss of value also increase (another manifestation of the 
Triffin dilemma); in a sense, the expected costs of holding reserves increase at the 
same time diminishing returns to the benefits of holding reserves (at the margin) 
sets in.  It is clear that today China is far more worried about its holdings of 
reserves than when those reserves were much smaller. 
But there is a partial response on the part of the countries holding reserves 
that will undercut these forces that otherwise might have led to reduced trade 
surpluses:  to hold reserves not in the currency of the United States (T-bills) and 
other hard currency areas but in non-financial assets or in less risky financial 
assets.  Several countries, for instance, sell inflation-indexed bonds, which protect 
against the risks of inflation that one might think would increase as the 
indebtedness of the country increases.  But such markets are relatively small and 
far less liquid than T-bill markets, so that they may be less effective in risk-
mitigation.33 Non-financial assets are, of course, more illiquid and still riskier.  
Yet, as government reserves increase, especially when the increase in reserves is 
due to the country pursuing an export-led growth strategy, governments are able 
to bear the additional risk, especially since such risks are accompanied by 
markedly higher returns when the funds are invested well.  The major problem, 
32 What matters, of course, is not just the change in the reserves, but the concomitant changes in 
behavior.  Regardless of whether the country has a trade deficit or surplus, a marginal change in 
reserves could be (and typically would be) accompanied by a corresponding change in trade (with 
consequent effects on aggregate demand). 
33 Moreover, they do not fully protect against exchange rate risk, at least in the short run, when 
purchasing power parity doesn’t hold.
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however, is political:  in spite of an official belief in free and open capital 
markets—and a demand that developing countries open up their capital markets to 
investors from advanced industrial countries—developed countries are likely to 
resist opening up their markets fully to sovereign wealth funds, or possibly even 
to firms in which governments have a large share.  Curtailing investment 
opportunities reduces the returns to holding reserves, and again, in balancing out 
the costs and benefits of reserve accumulations, this may lead governments to 
limit the size of reserves. 
Wealth Management and the Risk of a Two- or Three-Currency Reserve 
Regime 
The large reserve holdings—combined with the volatility of global financial 
markets and enhanced understanding of the principles of risk management—have 
changed perspectives on reserve management.34  It used to be a canon that 
reserves would be held in dollars.  But, as we have noted, the dollar is no longer a 
good store of value:  its value has been volatile and in secular decline.  Countries 
have learned about the principle of diversification.  Thus many (most) countries 
put a large fraction of their reserves in euros and other currencies.  Though the 
recent volatility in the value of the euro has highlighted that no currency is “safe,” 
it has not undermined the principle of diversification. 
The problem is that as countries take an increasingly active role in 
managing their reserves, the global financial system may become increasingly 
volatile; a two- or three-currency reserve system may be more volatile than a 
single currency system.  (For an excellent discussion of this, see Williamson 
[2010]).  If countries holding large amounts of reserves come to believe that the 
dollar will be decreasing in value relative to the euro (because, say, of political 
and economic events in the United States or Europe), they may dump dollars and 
buy euros; because they are sufficiently big players in the global financial 
markets, their purchases and sales collectively may move the market—reinforcing 
the decline in the dollar.   
Even in countries that might claim that they are not speculating, managers 
of reserves funds are held accountable.  They have to make judgments about 
relative returns in different assets, not necessarily on a minute by‐ ‐minute basis, 
but over longer periods. 
34 Our analysis of the demand for reserves has focused on factors other than the transactions 
demand, which has been stressed by others (Eichengreen 2010).  In a world of convertible 
currencies, there is no need to hold wealth in the same currency that one might spend the money, 
though a full risk analysis needs to take into account “real” returns measured appropriately.  Oil 
might be transacted in dollars, but holding a euro bond might still provide a better hedge against 
long‐term oil prices.  
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The largest holders of dollar reserves may, of course, act more cautiously, 
aware of the impact of the decline in the dollar’s value on their remaining 
holdings.  Moreover, those countries whose major motivation for holding reserves 
(at the margin) is exchange-rate management (for promoting export-led growth) 
may even be forced in these circumstances to increase their holdings of dollars, to 
avoid movements of the exchange rate.  But to balance the increasing risk of a 
loss in value, they may move holdings to higher yielding assets.  Given the 
fluidity of capital markets, such processes may contribute to global financial 
instability, as bubbles are fed in both the reserve currency and in the countries 
holding reserves.  
Other Strategies for Risk Mitigation 
While some reforms may slightly reduce the demand for reserves, we are not 
sanguine about any of the reforms currently under discussion having a significant 
enough impact to mitigate the need for a major reform of the global reserve 
system.   
The importance of providing alternative mechanisms for risk mitigation 
has now been widely recognized.35  The IMF has put itself forward as part of the 
solution.  Countries can turn to it as a source of liquidity in a crisis, rather than 
accumulating reserves.   
Such proposals, while well intentioned, are not likely to adequately 
address the problem.  Countries have to be confident that they can have access to 
the funds when they need them, without onerous conditions being imposed.  They 
need to have automatic drawing rights.  While previously they could be confident 
that onerous conditions would be imposed, more recent IMF programs have been 
far better.  But there are still some recent programs that have raised concerns.  
More fundamentally, while there have been notable reforms of governance at the 
IMF, the pace of change has been slow and the reforms have not been sufficiently 
deep to provide assurance that the current changes are permanent and not the 
happenstance of having a head of the organization who believes in Keynesian 
economics.  Indeed, proposed changes in voting rights, even when they are fully 
implemented, are, by themselves, almost surely too small to make much of a 
difference on most issues.   
In the absence of reforms that engender long-term confidence, countries 
will want funds that they can rely on—funds that are directly under their own 
control.  There is likely to be little shifting away from reliance on reserves.   
35 See, for example, Stiglitz (2006) and Wolf (2010). 
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Enhancing Global Stability 
Given that reserves will likely be the major form of “insurance” for some time to 
come, the overall performance of the global economy would be enhanced if other 
factors contributing to the demand for insurance were diminished, i.e. if the 
international community took actions that reduced the scope for global volatility 
and for the transmission of global volatility into national economies.   
Two sets of policies would contribute:  better coordination of global 
economic policy (including those directed at redressing global imbalances) and 
better financial sector regulation. 
Unfortunately, for all the talk of global macroeconomic coordination, 
there has been little progress.  This crisis provides ample evidence.  Each country 
determined the size of its stimulus largely on the basis of national considerations; 
for instance, Ireland could openly talk about being a free rider on a global 
economic recovery.  While recognizing that policies that maximized global 
multipliers gave the most bang for the buck, each country instead focused on 
maximizing national multipliers.36   
The crisis has brought home the role of financial and capital market 
deregulation and liberalization in causing the crisis and its rapid spread around the 
world.37  If countries respond to the crisis by re-regulating (in the appropriate 
way), the global economy may become more stable, and the demand for reserves 
may accordingly decrease.38 
VII. Towards a New Global Reserve System 
The UN Commission laid out a variety of alternative forms that a new global 
reserve system might take and a variety of ways by which the transition from the 
36 There is some evidence of coordination of monetary policies.  Still, the United States, for 
instance, may have welcomed the exchange rate effect of its extraordinarily low interest rate 
policies, even if they had adverse effects on Europe.  So too, Europe may benefit from the low 
exchange rate that followed the Greek crisis.
37 Preferential treatment of capital gains may have also encouraged speculative activity.  Tax 
policy can discourage such speculation and thus help to stabilize the economy, simultaneously 
reducing the need for reserves and thereby increasing global aggregate demand.
38 One more factor may have contributed to the magnitude of volatility faced by countries:  trade 
agreements (WTO as well as bilateral) have reduced the scope for countries to respond to the 
volatility of international prices.  This is exemplified by the movement from quotas to tariffs and 
the strong opposition of the U.S. to Colombia’s use of variable-rate tariffs for agriculture .  Even 
to the extent of engaging in protectionist stimulus programs, exemplified by the “buy America” 
provisions in the U.S. stimulus.  (While the US made its “buy America”provision WTO-compliant 
and exempted the least developing countries, this effectively led to discrimination against non-
LDC developing countries).   For a general discussion of why a shift from quotas to tariffs may 
increase risk, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977). 
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current system to the new one might be accomplished.  We will not repeat their 
fairly comprehensive discussion here.  What we will do is lay out the basic trade-
offs and argue for a preferred approach. 
Alternative Approaches 
All entail annual emissions of the new global reserve currency.39  The alternatives 
differ in their degree of “ambition,” the rules by which the global reserve currency 
(bancor) are distributed, and their institutional structures.   The least ambitious is 
a simple extension of the current system of special drawing rights (SDRs) within 
the IMF, which are issued only episodically. Under the new system, they would 
be issued regularly and in larger amounts.  The most ambitious is one which (a) 
allows the amounts to be issued to vary with the state of the global economy, so 
that the issuance of the global reserve could be an active instrument of global 
macroeconomic stabilization policies; (b) allows the funds to be used for the 
pursuit of global public goods, like development and climate change;  (c) builds in 
incentives for countries not to maintain high levels of surpluses, recognizing that 
persistent surpluses generate macroeconomic externalities on the global economy 
by contributing to an insufficiency of global aggregate demand; and (d) creates a 
new institutional structure to administer the new global reserve system.  
The more ambitious systems are, we believe, more likely to address 
effectively the deficiencies in the current system, but even more modest versions 
can have significant salutary effects.  The new system does not have to replace the 
old; the two can coexist, and it is possible that the transition can occur over time 
in a smooth way.  The more ambitious versions may be harder to negotiate—
though given the additional benefits that would be reaped, they might enjoy 
greater support. 
Our Preferred System 
We strongly believe that it would be desirable to move towards the more 
ambitious frameworks, which simultaneously address the central problems posed 
by the dollar reserve system (and discussed earlier in the paper) as well as other 
key problems in globalization.  Keynes—not surprisingly, given his focus on 
underemployment equilibria—argued for a system that taxed surplus countries.  
This could be implemented by reducing allocation of new reserves to countries 
with persistent surpluses.  These amounts could then be reallocated, e.g. for 
climate change or development. 
39 There are even simpler proposals which entail little more than countries turning in (all or part) 
of their current reserves in return for a holding in the new global currency.  An implicit issue in 
any such system is sharing the risk of changes in exchange rates.  
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There would be distinct advantages in having a rule-based system, for 
example with the issuance of reserves specified by agreed upon formulae.  
Though agreeing on the rules may prove difficult, this will obviate some of the 
worries about “government failure” (at the national or super-national level). It 
would make little difference whether such a rule-based system was administered 
by the IMF or a new agency.       
But even the least ambitious alternative would help ameliorate the 
problems we have identified.  By reducing, for instance, the demand for, say, 
dollar reserves (obviously less so than would be the case with the more ambitious 
alternatives), global aggregate demand would be strengthened.  Reduced reliance 
on the United States as a reserve currency would reduce the current anomaly of 
poor countries lending to the richest country in the world at a low interest rate, 
and borrowing funds at a high interest rate.   
Global stability might be enhanced (global macroeconomic volatility 
reduced) through several channels.  There is a broad consensus that the demand 
for ever-increasing reserves contributes to global imbalances.  At the very least, 
the persistence of these imbalances has contributed to global anxiety that there 
might be a disorderly unwinding of these imbalances.  Some believe that the 
“savings glut” associated with the buildup of reserves contributes to bubbles; and 
a move toward a global reserve system of the kind described, by reducing the 
need for savings for the buildup of reserves, would ameliorate this problem.40  
The risk of a playing-out of the fears of the Triffin dilemma is reduced.  Volatility 
in the supply of reserves from the United States (with the consequent disturbance 
to the global financial market equilibrium) as a result of changes in domestic 
politics or economics would be reduced.  Finally, the annual emissions of reserves 
would provide some buffer to developing countries without large reserves, 
reducing the likelihood of a balance of payments crisis, and the risk of the 
contagion of that crisis elsewhere.41   
In any case, we believe, for reasons already given, that such a system 
would be more stable, possibly substantially so, than the multiple reserve 
currency regime to which the world seems to be moving.   
The United States is often cited as the major source of opposition to the 
creation of a global reserve system, since it might lose the ability to borrow at 
such favorable terms—a particular concern now, given the size of the deficits.  
We believe, however, that the global equilibrium that would emerge would be 
40 See, for example, Wolf (2010). Stiglitz (2010) argues that the effects could have been offset by 
appropriate monetary and regulatory policy.
41 More generally, the risk properties of a global economic system with our proposed reforms 
would differ markedly from the existing system.  A full analysis of these properties takes into 
account the behavioural responses of governments and private actors (with each taking into 
account the induced changes in behaviour of the others).  
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associated with smaller U.S. trade deficits (as a result of a weaker exchange rate, 
from the reduced demand for dollars), and therefore there would be less need for 
government to run a fiscal deficit to maintain the economy at full employment 
(especially important in coming years, when the ability of monetary policy to 
provide stimulus may be severely limited).   The United States, too, would 
benefit—like all countries—from the stronger and more stable global economy.   
VIII. Regional Arrangements 
In spite of these advantages, it may be difficult politically to create a global 
reserve system—even one of the more modest versions—any time soon. Regional 
reserve arrangements, such as the Chiang Mai initiative, may, in these 
circumstances, be an important “half-way” house, especially if they can be 
designed in a way that gives confidence that the funds can be drawn upon when 
needed.42  Since downturns within a region are more likely to be correlated than 
downturns across the globe, there is an argument for providing insurance at a 
global level.  But this advantage seems to be more than offset by the greater 
difficulty of getting global agreements, at least of the kind that would provide 
confidence to countries that the funds would be there when they need them.  The 
large spillovers across countries within a region—and the greater understanding 
of each others’ economies and greater sense of solidarity43—make it more likely 
that money will be forthcoming. 44  
42 For example, provisions requiring IMF programs in order to draw upon the facility are 
counterproductive and will have to be eliminated.  While changes in the IMF in recent months 
may have made these restrictions less burdensome, countries in the region should have enough 
confidence in their own judgments about the appropriateness of the economic policies of their 
neighbors not to require the concordance of the IMF. To be sure, it makes sense for those within 
the region to consult with others on their views and to be sensitive to any global externalities.  But 
those in the region are likely to have a far better understanding of the economies in the region and 
to be far more sensitive to regional externalities.  
43 During the East Asia crisis, there was a widespread belief within Asia that the “Asian economic 
model” –with its large role for the government—was neither widely understood nor appreciated at 
the IMF or in the Finance Ministries and Treasuries of some of its major shareholders. There was 
a suspicion that many celebrated the crisis as confirming its deficiencies and the superiority of the 
American economic model.  At the time of the East Asia crisis, there were proposals for the 
creation of an Asian Monetary Fund.  The United States strongly opposed this initiative, which 
might have enabled the region to recover much more quickly, with a much shallower downturn.  
To many in the region, it appeared that the United States thought that such an institution would 
undermine the effectiveness of the IMF and American financial hegemony in the region.  
(Whether such an institution could have been created at the time without American opposition is 
open to debate, given opposition from within Asia; so too is whether these perceptions are 
accurate.  What is clear, however, is that these perceptions do affect current policy stances.)    See 
Stiglitz (2002) and Sakikabara (2001).
44 Just as the U.S. was the prime mover in the Mexico bailout of 1994-1995.  
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If effective regional reserve funds (or other arrangements that would 
mitigate risk) can be established, then the aggregate size of the requisite “dollar” 
reserves can be smaller—and therefore the deflationary impact of annual 
increases in the size of the funds will be diminished.   
The UN Commission report commends the regional arrangements (such as 
the Chiang Mai initiative), encourages their expansion, and sees this as a possible 
way forward in the creation of a new global reserve system.  This can be done in 
two ways:  either through open regional systems, in which countries not in the 
region eventually are allowed to join into the regional arrangements; or by joining 
together the various regional arrangements into a global system. 
Regional cooperation can take many forms—just as global cooperation 
can.  Just as we have argued for the virtues of a more ambitious global 
arrangement, so too we would argue for a more ambitious regional arrangement.  
A modest arrangement would entail a vastly expanded swap arrangement along 
the lines of current initiatives. But we would encourage the consideration of 
deeper arrangements, the creation of a regional reserve currency (an 
“ASIABANCOR”), with emissions of reserves being used to promote stability 
and growth.   
Regions like Asia or South America are too diverse to satisfy the 
conditions for an optimal currency area; but the conditions for ensuring the 
success of a reserve currency are much less stringent.  Such a reserve currency 
need not fully replace the use of other currencies in reserves. 
A Portfolio Approach 
As we have noted, regional reserve arrangements do not allow risk diversification 
to the same extent that a global reserve arrangement would.  Yet, given the 
limited likelihood of a quick adoption of a global reserve system, we would 
encourage a portfolio approach—moving forward on several forms 
simultaneously:  more ambitious regional arrangements concurrently with less 
ambitious arrangements at the international level, such as using SDR expansions 
for financing climate change policies.  
IX. Concluding Comments 
The world’s financial system has been marked by a high level of instability in 
recent decades.  The view of free-market fundamentalists that a movement to free 
and fully flexible exchange rates accompanied by financial and capital market 
liberalization would automatically be accompanied by the development of good 
markets for managing risk and a new era of true stability and high growth (as the 
episodic adjustments of exchange rates under the old regime came to an end) has 
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been proven wrong.  There have been far more financial crises—more than 120 in 
the last three decades; growth in most countries—other than those that did not buy 
fully into these doctrines—has actually been slower; and inequality has 
increased.45  The international community has not managed these crises in ways 
that have instilled confidence, at least within developing countries. 
Most of the crises occurred in developing countries, with the IMF and the 
G-7 bailing out Western banks that had made bad lending decisions—but with the 
burden of the bailout falling on the citizens of the developing countries.  The 
effects of the crises were contained.  So too, as the bubbles within the advanced 
industrial countries broke, government came to the rescue, with the Greenspan-
Bernanke put.  The inference made by many was that the system—free-market 
economics—worked wonders.  But it was the wrong inference.  What enabled the 
system to work, at least as well as it did, was that government was constantly 
coming to the rescue.46 
This crisis has brought out into the open the deficiencies in current 
economic arrangements and the economic philosophies that underpin them.  But 
these economic arrangements have served certain interests well; not surprisingly, 
reforms have been slow.  Changing global economic arrangements is even more 
difficult.   
The consequence is, as we have argued, heightened demands for reserves.  
The magnitude of these increases might be diminished with reforms in the ways 
that the international financial institutions work and in the “global financial and 
economic architecture”—rethinking, for instance, the principles of financial and 
capital market liberalization, both as they affect movements of capital and finance 
across borders and as they affect financial markets within a country; improving 
private financial markets so that they actually do a better job in managing risks, 
especially those facing developing countries;  reforming the ways in which 
sovereign debt is restructured; and reforming the global trading system, which 
allows countries to manage their risks better and promote their development more 
effectively.  Even with such reforms, there are likely to be substantial increases in 
reserve holdings in coming years—a form of precautionary savings that will 
weaken global aggregate demand.  But without such reforms, the increases will be 
even larger, and the global economy even weaker.   Of particular concern is the 
limited ability of monetary and fiscal policies to offset these adverse effects in the 
immediate future. 
We have argued in this paper that a new global reserve system is therefore 
essential, if we are to restore the global economy to sustained prosperity and 
stability.  But achieving this, too, will not be easy.  In the interim, the countries of 
Asia and Latin America have an opportunity to strengthen existing regional 
45 There may, of course, be many other factors contributing to these macroeconomic changes.  
46 See Stiglitz (2010) and Soros (2008).
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arrangements.  Doing so would not only contribute to the strength of their 
economies, but possibly also be a critical building block in the creation of a new 
global reserve system. 
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